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OUBLE-EFFECT REASONING (DER)-often called the "principle," "rule," or "doctrine" of double effect-is often, if not always, attributed to Thomas Aquinas tout court.' Yet, I will argue, Thomas's account substantially differs from contemporary double-effect reasoning (DER) insofar as Thomas considers the ethical status of risking an assailant's life while contemporary accounts of DER focus on actions causing harm foreseen as inevitable. 2 Of course, if DER applies to cases in which harm is foreseen as an inevitable result of an otherwise good action, it will apply * I thank Professor Ralph Mcinerny for the opportunity to present an earlier version of this paper at the Second Annual Thomistic Conference at the University of Notre Dame. I thank Professor Raymond Dennehy for the chance to read a portion of this paper before the American Maritain Association's 1995 meeting in San Francisco, California. Finally, I thank Professor Michael Torre for his insightful criticims and close reading of this paper from which it and I profited greatly. 1 The standard article on the history of DER is Joseph Mangan's "An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect," Theological Studies 10 (1949): 41-61. J. Ghoos differs with Mangan over exactly where in Aquinas's work the sources of DER can be found: ]. Ghoos, "L'Acte a Double Effet: Etude de Theologie Positive," Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 2 7 (1951): 30-52. In fact, what Ghoos notes, although not explicitly, is the conflation by Thomas's interpreters of two distinct strands in Aquinas's work: the indirect voluntary of Summa Theologiae 1-11, q. 6, a. 3 and double effect of STh 11-11, q. 64, a. 7. For a more recent consideration of the history of DER see L.1. Ugorji, The Principle of Double Effect: A Critical Appraisal of Its 1raditional Understanding and Its Modern Reinterpretation (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1985) . 
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to cases in which harm is foreseen as being a possible result. The reverse, however, need not obtain. For example, one might think that it is ethical for an ironworker knowingly to risk his life doing dangerous work while one would not think it ethical for the ironworker knowingly to do work from which his death would follow inevitably. Thus, one might think that it is ethical to risk causing harm that one would not think it ethical to cause inevitably. I will argue that Aquinas holds something like this in his account of DER l. QUESTION 
64, ARTICLE 7, AND PRAETER INTENTION EM
The locus classicus of double-effect reasoning is Aquinas's discussion of homicidal self-defense in STh II-II, q. 64, a. 7. 3 Question 64 occurs within Aquinas's consideration of vices opposed to commutative justice. It concerns what Aquinas considers the greatest injury committed upon one's neighbor against his will: his death.
In article 7, Thomas asks whether it is licit to kill a man in self-defense. He offers a number of objections, two of which are voiced by St. Augustine. The first comes from his epistle to Publicola; the second Thomas takes from De libero arbitrio. In the latter Augustine asks, "How are they free from sin in the sight of divine providence who, for the sake of these contemnible things, have taken a human life?" (obj. 2). Aquinas notes that among the slight goods that men may forfeit against their wills, Augustine includes corporeal life. Augustine appears to rule out homicidal self-defense.
Aquinas interprets Augustine as not permitting the intentional taking of an aggressor's life. He has noted earlier in his discussion of war (STh II-II, q. 40, a. 1) that Augustine thinks it licit for one charged with the public good to take life during a war. Accordingly, Aquinas considers the bailiff and the soldier to be agents who may in self-defense and as public officials intentionally take the life of an aggressor. Thus, in q. 64, a. 7, the self-defense of particular interest is that of the private individual, as such, taking the life of an assailant.
The corpus of q. 64, a. 7 reads:
Nothing prevents one act from having two effects, of which only one is intended, the other being praeter intentionem. Yet, as Steven Windass notes, by praeter intentionem Aquinas has been taken to mean that "you can in case of necessity kill in self-defense, provided that in a special theological sense you do not intend to do so." 6 Some interpreters of Aquinas do attribute to him an idiosyncratic doctrine concerning intention. Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., notes, "Aquinas is one of the chief architects of the tradition in which the doctrine of direction of intention was developed." 7 We find an account of the direction of one's intention in Pascal's famous parody of Jesuit casuistry, in the seventh letter of Les provinciales. There Pascal presents his famous Jesuit's infamous grande methode de diriger l'intention. 8 According to Pascal's Jesuit, by following this method one can stroll about the dueling green, not intending to fight one's opponent, but intending to walk about. Of course, if one's opponent attacked, one could defend oneself. This, following the logic of the method of directing one's intention, would not be dueling. 9 Aquinas himself, however, nowhere articulates such a doctrine.
Boyle claims that such a doctrine grounds DER: "The doctrine of the double effect presupposes at least this: that one can direct his intention to the good effect of his action and withhold it from the bad effect if the latter is not a means to the former." 10 Such a direction of intention or withholding of intention would itself be intentional. Insofar as DER theorists think that intentions are ethically relevant, they will presumably think that intentions with respect to one's intentions (second-order intentions) are also ethically relevant. Of course, directing one's intention would be a second-order intention. 11 DER does not repose-indeed, may not be able to repose-on the direction, withholding, or paring of one's intentions. It does, however, rest on one's being able to foresee harm without intending harm. It is at best an infelicity to speak of not intending some foreseen harm as directing one's intention away from the foreseen harm. If there were such a method of intention, it would found a "morality of gestures and poses." 12 In any case, Aquinas does not propose such a morality, nor does he use praeter intentionem to refer to some special way of intending.
Aquinas says that what is praeter intentionem is per accidens. He has been interpreted as meaning that it is accidental in the sense of being an accidental consequence. For example, referring to q. 64, a. 7, Anthony Kenny claims, "In the context it is not clear whether Aquinas is justifying accidental killing in the course of a struggle or intentional killing when this is the only way to avoid being killed."u Yet Aquinas explicitly denies the justifiability of a private individual's intentional killing of an aggressor (q. 64, a. 7 and ad 2). Does Aquinas mean to speak, as Kenny suggests, of an accidental killing in the course of a struggle?
What would it mean to say that one accidentally killed another in the course of a struggle? It would mean that one were engaged in pushing and shoving and pulling another and that the aggressor's death came about, say, by his tripping, falling, and breaking his neck. Such a death would result accidentally, just as someone could die while engaged in friendly horseplay.
If this is what Aquinas means when he claims that what is praeter intentionem is accidental, then he has brought out an unwieldy concept to attend to what almost every action-theorist acknowledges: an agent is not responsible for consequences that accidentally result from his actions. Moreover, in the very next article Aquinas asks whether an agent who has killed a man by chance (casualiter occidens hominem, a. 8) is guilty of homicide. He answers in the negative. This point already would have been addressed if what is praeter intentionem were per accidens in the sense of being an accidental consequence.
Kenny is not alone in his interpretation. Steven Windass, in a separate investigation, understands Thomas to consider the attacker's death as an accidental consequence. Offering what he takes to be Aquinas's position, Windass says, "it is lawful to repel force by force; if this results in the death of the attacker, the death will be accidental." 14 As noted, there are good reasons internal to Aquinas's discussion to think that he does not mean that the death of the assailant will be accidental. Windass notes that "it would be very odd [of Aquinas] to discuss the permissibility of different kinds of accident." 15 I agree. It would be very odd of Thomas to use such a distinction to discuss kinds of accidental consequences. I take this to be a reason to think that he does not so use praeter intentionem.
III. INTENTION AND THE ETHICAL ANALYSIS OF AN ACT
In STh I-II, q. 12, Aquinas considers intention. In a. 1 he claims, "intention, just as the very word implies, means to tend to something [in aliquid tendere ]". Since the will (voluntas) moves the powers of the soul to their appropriate ends, it is evident, Thomas asserts, that intention is an act of the will. He argues that intention is the act of the will with respect to the end "as the term towards which something is ordained" (STh I-II, q.  12, a. 1, ad 4) .
According to Thomas, we will the end, we choose the means, and we intend the complex end-through-means. Using his example, when we intend health, we intend health-by-means-of-medicine. We choose medicine-for-the-sake-of-health. How does Aquinas understand the agent's intention to relate to the goodness of the agent's act?
Thomas offers an elaborate account of the goodness and badness of human actions in STh I-II, qq. 18-21. For the sake of understanding his statement in q. 64, a. 7, it is not necessary to articulate his entire analysis. Nevertheless, what he has to say about the relation of the intention of the end to the moral analysis of the goodness or badness of an act requires attention.
Each aspect of an action relates variously to the others. This reflects the Dionysian dictum that goodness is integral; evil, the lack of such integrity, vitiates what otherwise is morally good (STh I-II, q. 19, a. 6, ad 1). 16 For the moral assessment of an act, three aspects of the act require attention: what is being done (the deed or object), the circumstances in which it is done, and the end or reason it is done (STh I-II, q. 18, a. 1). According to Thomas, therefore, the intention of the end is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for a complete analysis of the action's ethical status.
In If an assailant's death results from a private individual's justified act of self-defense and the death is neither intended nor accidental, how is the death further, and positively, characterized? In q. 64, a. 7, Aquinas proposes and contrasts two cases of homicidal self-defense, that of a public official and that of a private individual. I will contrast these two cases in order to characterize, in a positive manner, the death of an assailant in the case of a private individual's justified homicidal self-defense.
IV. Two CASES CONTRASTED
Aquinas holds that an officer of the polity-a "police officer," in contemporary terms-can intend to take the life of his aggressor as long as he uses minimal force (proportionatus fini), refers the slaying to the common good, and does not harbor animosity against the attacker (q. 64, a. 7). In the case of a private individual's justified homicidal self-defense, Thomas accepts the slaying of the assailant as long as it results from the use of minimal force and is not intentional. Both cases have the requirement that the force used be proportionatus fini. I take this to mean that the force used must be minimal; that is, not more than is necessary for the preservation of one's life.
Suppose that I am a private individual. Both I and my assailant have swords. We begin to fight with them. I realize that my aggressor has far greater endurance than I and that the only way I can preserve my life is to kill him, say by cutting off his head. According to Thomas, I cannot do so because I cannot intentionally kill him. I, as a private individual, would not be permitted so to def end myself. If I were an officer of the state, however, executing my role as such, and I were in this same situation, Aquinas holds it permissible for me intentionally to take the life of the aggressor by cutting off his head.
Thus, while in both cases the force used must be proportionatus fini, this corresponds to a larger set of possible responses in the case of the officer of the state, who, according to Thomas, may proximately intend to take his assailant's life. Therefore, he may use a neck-severing sword stroke, for it is proportioned to this end.
In the case of a private individual, minimal force does not include cases in which such force corresponds to an intention to take the life of the attacker. The private individual cannot inten-tionally take the assailant's life; thus, he cannot use means proportioned to the taking of that life. A neck-severing sword stroke is such a means. Such a sword stroke is proportioned to the preservation of one's own life only insofar as it is proportioned to the taking of the aggressor's life. Therefore, according to Thomas, a private individual cannot use such a sword stroke.
Thus, when Windass asserts that in asking for double effect's reading of an ethical act of self-defense, "you can be fairly sure that ... your original impression of what you could actually do would not be changed," 11 he is right about the pilloried Jesuit of Pascal's seventh provincial letter, but not about Thomas.
I have assumed that Aquinas would permit the use of a weapon, and even a potentially deadly one (a sword). A weapon is an instrument. As an instrument it admits of characteristic ends. One defending his own life with a sword may not maintain that his assailant's death results accidentally from the employment of a sword. One of the ends to which sword makers fashion swords is the taking of human life. Presumably, a sword not fit for the taking of another's life is not much of a sword.
Using of a sword is different from pushing an attacker, who then stumbles on the curb, falls, and dies of a broken neck. Characteristically, pushing, shoving, pulling, scratching, biting, kicking, gouging, and generally being a great nuisance to an aggressor does not result in his death. If death were to result from such acts, it would result accidentally. Because death does not characteristically result from the ingenious deployment of teeth, nails, knees, elbows, and fists, one's attacker could not charge one with endangering his life by so def ending oneself.
If one were to use a sword, however, the attacker could claim that his life had been endangered. This is significant for two reasons. First, although the one defending himself by means of a sword may not intend to take the life of the aggressor, he is willing to risk taking the aggressor's life. Second, if intending to take another's life differs from knowingly endangering another's life, then there is something else besides the assailant's death resulting either intentionally or accidentally; namely, the assailant's death resulting as a risked consequence.
V. RISKING HOMICIDE
Accidental homicide differs from homicide that results from having endangered life. In an accidental killing, the agent inculpably does not foresee the death. When death results from having knowingly endangered someone's life, however, the agent foresaw the death as a possible consequence of his action. Accordingly, when one kills someone accidentally, one is not ethically responsible for his death; when one kills someone whose life one has knowingly endangered, one is ethically responsible for his death.
Does intentionally killing someone differ from killing someone as the result of risking his life? When one intends to take another's life, one certainly endangers his life. Indeed, being the object of someone's intention to kill is probably the most extreme case of having one's life endangered. But is the reverse true? Does one intend to take a life if one endangers that life? For example, does one intend to take one's own life when one endangers one's own life?
Soldiers, stuntmen, race-car drivers, police officers, firefighters, and construction workers knowingly endanger their lives. Do they intend their own deaths? Perhaps some of them do, and perhaps some of them ought not so to endanger their lives even if they do not intend to take them. In any case, it would indeed be an eccentric theory of intention that concluded that anyone who knowingly imperiled his life intended his death. Similarly, there is no reason to say that knowingly jeopardizing another's life is to intend his death.
Chancing the assailant's life is precisely what I do if I do not intend to take his life, but knowingly risk it in defense of my own life. I choose to risk his life rather than to forfeit my own, and such a choice on my part is ethically assessable. That the assailant's death characteristically might follow from my using a sword in defense of my life indicates that I am more willing to preserve my life than I. am to forego hazarding the assailant's.
As I understand Aquinas, he proposes that a private individ-ual may not intend to take the life of an assailant, but that he may knowingly risk the assailant's life by defending himself with such force that the aggressor's death, if it results, would be one of the foreseeable characteristic consequences of the selfdef ensive act. This interpretation may strike some as novel. Nevertheless, it accords with what Aquinas himself implies when he asserts that "the act of fornication or of adultery is not ordered to the conservation of one's own life out of necessity as is the act from which sometimes [quandoque] follows homicide" (q. 64, a. 7, ad 4). Aquinas restricts praeter intentionem, as he uses it in his consideration of self-defense, to what occurs sometimes, but not always. Thus, in q. 64, a. 7 he does not appear to consider the foresight of an inevitable consequence, for such a consequence would not be said to follow "sometimes."
Boyle offers an interpretation of q. 64, a. 7 that substantially differs from my account. He notes that the use of "quandoque" to describe the frequency of the deadly consequence following from an act of self-defense suggests that the assailant's death is not a natural and totally predictable consequence of the act as such. 18 Nonetheless, he denies that quandoque has this meaning in q. 64, a. 7. He asserts that the assailant's death is foreseen as a totally predictable and inevitable consequence of the act of moderate self-defense proposed by Aquinas. Having noted that with quandoque Thomas seems to exclude some acts of self-defense, Boyle observes, There appear to be types of self-defense in which the use of the minimum force needed to preserve one's life does have the assailant's death as a natural and certainly foreseeable consequence. 19 I agree. There are such instances, such as the neck-severing sword stroke. As I have argued, Aquinas rules out precisely such a case. Boyle, however, thinks that Aquinas considers such an act to be ethically in the clear.
Boyle notes that Thomas uses praeter intentionem one hundred and forty-three times in his massive reuvre. 20 He concedes that Thomas usually uses this term to refer to consequences that follow sometimes, or rarely. Yet he also notes that Aquinas (infrequently) uses praeter intentionem to refer to consequences that follow always or for the most part. 21 In objection to my interpretation, one might argue that quandoque refers not to homicidal self-defense but to self-defense in general. Thus, Thomas would be saying that self-defense is justified, even though the death of the aggressor sometimes follows from acts of self-defense. This, however, is a non-starter, for the question is whether homicidal self-defense is justified, not whether self-defense simpliciter is justified. Although it sounds awkward, one could say that Aquinas argues that when the conditions of DER have been met, a private individual 1 s act of homicidal self-defense that is sometimes homicidal is justified.
In the standard contemporary cases of DER, such as tactical bombing that harms noncombatants and palliative morphine administration to a terminally ill patient that hastens or causes death, the harm is foreseen as an inevitable consequence of the action. In his account of a private individual1s justified homicidal self-defense, Thomas holds that the defender knowingly risked the assailant 1 s life. This excludes the use of means that one foresees as inevitably resulting in death, for one could not be said knowingly to risk killing the aggressor if one foresaw that one would inevitably kill him. Thus, Aquinas's originating account of DER substantially differs from what DER has become insofar as Thomas restricts his account to cases in which one can be said to risk foreseen harm.
VI. THE SECOND CONDITION OF DER
Aquinas's account of DER is not simply that it is ethically permissible to risk causing the death of one's assailant insofar as one does not intend to kill him. 2 2 This is only the first condition: the foreseen risked consequence is not intended. In common with contemporary accounts of DER, Aquinas argues that there is a second condition to be met for the risking of the harm to be justified.
It is not necessary for salvation for a man to forego (praetermittat) an act of moderate defense in order to avoid (evitandum) the death of another, since a man is more responsible to provide (plus tenetur ... providere) for his own life than for that of another. (Q. 64, a. 7) Thomas asserts that one has a greater obligation to watch over one's own life than to watch over another's. Thus, when it comes to preserving lives, ceteris paribus, one is more obliged to preserve one's own than another's. Of course, covered by the "other things being equal" clause are such factors as the role one has with respect to the other's life that is at risk. For example, a captain of a sinking ship may be more obliged to care for a passenger's life than for his own.
When one's own life has been put at risk by an assailant, since one is, ceteris paribus, more bound to care for one's own life than for another's, one need not forego risking the attacker's life. One 22 Pace Alan Donagan. Donagan (perhaps misled by the exclusive attention paid by some advocates of DER to the intended/foreseen distinction) asserts, "Finally, the doctrine underlying all forms of the theory of double effect is that what lies outside the scope of a man's intentions in acting does not belong in his action, and so is not subject to moral judgement" (Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977] , 164, emphasis added; see also 122). If this were the case, the second condition would be otiose. Clearly, Thomas understands the first condition to be necessary, but not sufficient for DER. who would not defend his own life when this entails endangering the life of the attacker might exercise too little responsibility with respect to the good of life in his care. Self-defense may be not only permissible, but even required, when not to defend one's own life is to act with too little care for what has been entrusted to one.
VII. SUMMARY
Aquinas offers the following analysis of an act that is ethically in the clear, but for its risking foreseen harm. First, the harm cannot be intended. Second, the act fulfills some responsibility of the agent that is greater than the responsibility the agent has to avoid the harm.
In his account of a private individual's justified homicidal self-defense, Thomas presents the seeds of DER as it is presently understood. Yet in one important feature his contribution differs from contemporary double-effect reasoning. That feature became evident in his use of quandoque to characterize the assailant's death as risked.
It requires a considerable, and, as I have argued, ultimately untenable, interpretive stretch to attribute to Thomas the application of praeter intentionem in his treatment of a private individual's act of homicidal self-defense to cases in which the assailant's death is foreseen as resulting inevitably. Accordingly, one cannot attribute contemporary double-effect reasoning to Thomas tout court.
The point of this paper has been to argue that Thomas does not use DER to justify a private individual's homicidal selfdefense in cases in which the aggressor's death is foreseen as inevitable. He does use it in cases in which the assailant's life was risked. If one does not note this difference, one will attribute to Aquinas an idiosyncratic account of intention which he does not have. For example, Jeff McMahan, following the customary interpretation, says:
Aquinas ... assumes that it is possible for one to foresee with certainty that one's act will kill one's assailant without intending the killing as a means of self-defense .... To illustrate [this] view, consider: Self Defense 1: One's only defense against an unjust and potentially lethal attack is to shoot the attacker at close range with a flamethrower."
McMahan thinks that Aquinas and "the followers of Aquinas" hold that this is an instance of self-defense justified by DER. 24 If one thinks that a defender can shoot one's attacker at close range with a flame-thrower, and that this is not intentional, then one seems to rely on a very narrow conception of what it is to intend a means. Furthermore, how would one then argue that, for example, a terror bomber cannot drop bombs on noncombatants without intending their deaths? If one can use DER in the case of self-defense presented by McMahan, then one seems able to use it in terror bombing as well. As McMahan notes, such an account of DER "results in an unacceptably permissive doctrine" 25 -the very doctrine parodied by Pascal.
What does Thomas's account imply about the contemporary application of DER to cases, such as death-hastening palliative morphine administration to a terminally ill patient and tactical bombing that harms non-combatants, in which agents foresee the harm as resulting inevitably? Are there ethically relevant differences between self-defense and other cases of DER? 26 These questions deserve consideration; nonetheless, they belong to a paper other than the present one.
